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LABOR'S MANY CONSTITUTIONS (AND
CAPITAL'S TOO)
Eric Tuckert
The movement to constitutionalize collective labor rights is growing as
rapidly as organized labor's economic and political strength is eroding.
This is not surprising. In an era in which organized labor enjoyed
significant bargaining power and had the capacity to influence labor law,
labor market policy, and macroeconomic policy more generally, there was
no need to find ways to limit the ways states could legislate with respect to
collective labor rights. It is precisely the loss of labor's power and the shift
from a Keynesian or social democratic agenda, which supported collective
bargaining as a macroeconomic policy, to a neoliberal agenda, which sees
labor rights as market impeding, that has motivated efforts to put labor
rights beyond the reach of ordinary government action.
There is already a large body of academic work addressing the
constitutionalization of labor rights and so there is some burden on any one
adding to it to justify their intervention. My goal in this Article is to
explore three issues that have not been adequately addressed. First, there is
a need to unpack, at a conceptual level, two distinct dimensions of
collective labor rights, their thickness, and their hardness. I will elaborate
on these further, but briefly by thickness I refer to the substantive content of
labor rights, and by hardness I refer to their enforceability. These
dimensions of labor rights have not been extensively considered because
most writers have a pretty fixed idea of both. Collective labor rights are
built around the principle of freedom of association and include the right to
form unions, to bargain collectively and to strike and constitutional labor
rights are legally enforceable. My goal here is to disrupt this settled
understanding and provide a different analytical lens that allows us see and
think more broadly about labor rights and how they are constitutionalized.
Second, I want to open up a discussion about the different geographic
scales at which labor rights are being constitutionalized. For the most part,
t Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario. This Article
originated as a response to a paper by Ruth Dukes given at the Voices at Work workshop. I want to
thank Ruth for her stimulating paper. I benefited from comments by workshop participants as well as
from Harry Glasbeek, Judy Fudge, and Brian Ray.
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the literature addresses them separately. For example, Canadian labor
rights are discussed at the national level under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms' (Charter), at the regional level under the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation2 (NAALC), and at the international level,
through the International Labor Organization 3 (ILO). They are not usually
considered together as a constitutionalizing structure. My goal here is to do
precisely that so that we can better see the relationships between the
different geographic scales and instruments through which the
constitutionalization project is being pursued.
Finally, I want to put the project of constitutionalizing labor rights into
the context of other constitutionalization projects that are also being
actively pursued. While other writers have emphasized the salience of the
neoliberal political-economic context for the development of
constitutionalized labor rights, there has not been a discussion that
compares the constitutionalization of labor rights with the
constitutionalization of a neoliberal order. Not only does this comparison
emphasize the significance of the neoliberal context in which the labor
rights constitutionalization project is being pursued, but by comparing the
hardness and thickness of the two constitutionalization projects at their
different geographic scales we can better appreciate the ways in which these
two projects shape and are shaped by each other.
Before turning to these issues, however, it is necessary to clarify the
term constitutionalization, because there may be some controversy over
what properly fits within its parameters. Martin Loughlin recently defined
the term as "the attempt to subject all governmental action within a
designated field to the structures, processes, principles and values of a
'constitution."' This formulation self-consciously recognizes the difficulty
of defining a constitution and Loughlin spends some time talking about the
evolution of constitutions and constitutional arrangements, as well as their
ideological content. For our purposes, there are two key issues that need to
be sorted out. First, Loughlin contrasts a republican notion of
constitutionalism with a liberal one. In the former, government action is
contained through the creation of institutional arrangements that provide for
limited government. The classic form is the U.S. system of checks and
1. Canadian Charter ofRights ofFreedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11.
2. North American Agreement on Labor Corporation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
605.
3. The ILO is the international organization responsible for drawing up and overseeing
international labor standards. For its history, see ANTHONY EVELYN ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1971).
4. Martin Loughlin, What Is Constitutionalisation, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 47,
47 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010).
356
LABOR'S MANY CONSTITUTIONS
balances through which political power is institutionally divided. The
alternative, liberal constitutionalism, casts the constitution as a set of
positive laws that are enforced by judicial bodies.
These different approaches to constitutionalization are reflected in the
contrasting views of Otto Kahn-Freund and Hugo Sinzheimer. For Kahn-
Freund, the optimal way to institutionalize labor rights was by embedding
them in labor market institutions and practices, while Sinzheimer sought to
have them positively juridified in Germany's Weimar constitution.5  Our
concern here is not which of these approaches is preferable for the purposes
of advancing labor rights, but rather what we count as constitutionalization.
Loughlin, I think, correctly observes that in contemporary practice,
"especially when harnessed to the socio-economic forces that have been
driving recent government changes (i.e., liberalization, marketization,
globalization. . . . [c]onstitutionalisation refers to the processes by which an
increasing range of public life is being subjected to the discipline of the
norms of liberal-legal constitutionalism."6 Therefore, for the purposes of
this paper, we adopt Loughlin's definition of constitutionalization.
The second key issue is the contrast between domestic
constitutionalization and supranational constitutionalization. The project of
national constitutionalization is an old one although in many countries, like
Canada, it has been deepened in recent decades by the triumph of the
liberal-legal model. During this period of national constitutional
development, there has also been a growth in supranational
constitutionalism, which has two aspects according to Loughlin. The first
involves the constitutionalization of transnational bodies themselves while
the second is the emergence of networks of transnational governance that
have eroded the foundational elements of national constitutionalism.' With
regard to the latter, Loughlin is reluctant to label phenomena like the
legalization of World Trade Organization (WTO) enforcement processes as
constitutional, or at least sees this characterization as highly speculative.
Others share his view.8 Notwithstanding these considered objections, for
our purposes it is useful to think of both these developments as aspects of
constitutionalization. First, the distinction that Loughlin draws between the
constitutionalization of institutions and governance networks is arguably
not as sharp as he makes it out to be. While the WTO is not the same as the
EU, it is a governance institution whose purpose is to constrain government
5. Ruth Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the
Role ofLabour Law, 35 J. L. & SOc'Y 341, 343 (2008).
6. Louglin, supra note 4, at 61.
7. Id. at 63-64.
8. In addition to the authors footnoted by Loughlin, id., see MARC D. FROESE, CANADA AT THE
WTO9-11 (2010).
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action in ways that are not easily ignored or undone. David Schneiderman
has forcefully argued that the investor rules regime is constitution-like in
that "[i]t has the object of placing legal limits on the authority of
government, isolating economic power from political power, and assigning
investor interests the highest possible protection."9 Second, our focus here
is not on the question of whether labor or capital rights are fully
constitutionalized, but rather how far the projects of constitutionalization
have advanced. Therefore, even if it is correct to say that supranational
constitutionalization is incomplete and contested, it still remains important
to analyze the project itself.
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, it briefly discusses the
thickness and hardness dimensions of labor's constitution. Second, it uses
these two dimensions to map labor's constitution at the national, regional,
and international geographic scales. At the same time, it also maps
capital's constitution. Finally, the Article comes back briefly to suggest
ways in which this comparative mapping approach can help us think more
clearly about the challenges that lie ahead for the project of
constitutionalizing labor rights.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL MAPPING
For the purposes of mapping labor's constitution, I think it will be
useful to focus on three of its dimensions. The first builds on the distinction
that Ruth Dukes identifies between a thin conception of labor's constitution,
focused on freedom of association and collective bargaining, and a thicker
one, such as Sinzheimer's, that encompasses fundamental socioeconomic
arrangements, such as those governing management and control of the
means of production, and the political rules and institutional arrangements
that shape the power resources of labor and capital. In this thicker view,
labor's constitution is part and parcel of an economic constitution that
creates and supports economic democracy.' 0 The focus here, then, is on the
thickness of labor's constitution, particularly as it relates to rights
associated with workers' voice, although in other contexts we could extend
this dimension to other aspects of labor's constitution, such as the extent to
which it requires or prioritizes socioeconomic arrangements that support a
human capabilities or human development project."
9. DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION4 (2008).
10. Ruth Dukes, Hugo Sinzheimer and the Constitutional Function ofLabour Law, in THE IDEA OF
LABOUR LAW 57, 58-61 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011).
11. For a neo-Fabian approach that builds on Amartya Sen's work, see SIMON DEAKIN & FRANK
WILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOUR MARKET (2005). For a Marxist approach, see MICHAEL A.
LEBOWITZ, THE SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE: REAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2010).
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A second dimension of constitutionalization that Dukes also addresses
is its hardness or softness. She raises this in the context of her discussion of
Articles 159 and 165 of the Weimar Constitution. Article 159 contained a
thinner set of labor rights focused on the protection of freedom of
association, while Article 165 purported to constitutionalize economic
democracy. Weimar courts treated Article 159 as hard juridical law, but
read Article 165 as an aspirational declaration whose realization depended
upon legislative implementation that never materialized.
A third dimension of labor's constitution is its geographic scale. Here
we can construct a continuum between national or even subnational
political units on one end, expanding to regional and then to global
institutions at the other. The growth of labor's transnational constitution is
a twentieth century story that has been told elsewhere.12 Although it is
arguably the case that the regional and global scale of labor's constitution
was insignificant in the first half of the twentieth century, they cannot be
ignored at the turn of the twenty-first.
If we start running these three dimensions together, the necessity to
talk about labor's many constitutions becomes clearer. More importantly, I
hope this way of mapping helps us to navigate our way through the
enormous complexity and difficulty of the current labor
constitutionalization project. However, before trying to demonstrate this
through a discussion of Canada's labor constitution, I want to raise one
further complication: while we are focused on labor's constitution, it is
crucial that we do not ignore other constitutionalization projects that are
simultaneously being pursued and that may be antithetical to the realization
of labor's constitution, thickly or thinly conceived. This concern has
become more important in recent decades given the growing disjuncture
between the partial constitutionalization of thin labor rights and the rise of
what some have characterized as "the new constitutionalism,"13 which has
enhanced and anchored the power of capital by putting property and
contract beyond the reach of local or national state interference, as part of
larger project of creating a neoliberal social structure of accumulation
(SSA).14
12. For a brief overview, see BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 25-67 (2005).
13. Stephen Gill, Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism, 24
MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 399 (1995); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). See also Judy Fudge, Constitutionalizing
Labour Rights in Europe, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 244 (Tom Campbell et al.
eds., 2011) (exploring this paradox in the European context).
14. Social structure of accumulation theory emphasizes the role of political and cultural
institutions, as well as economic ones, that support capitalist accumulation. A recent collection
elaborates on the rise of a neoliberal social structure of accumulation since the 1980s. See
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM AND ITS CRISES (Terrence McDonagh et al. eds., 2010).
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Not only is there a disjuncture between these two projects, but many
argue that at the thicker levels of constitutionalization the tide is strongly
running in favor of capital's constitution.15  It is difficult to think of a
jurisdiction where a thick conception of labor rights, embracing economic
democracy and prioritizing human development, has been strengthened
over this period, while there are many where, to the extent that these
arrangements existed, they have been weakened and the "new
constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism" has been more firmly
entrenched.16 The result is a vicious circle. A neoliberal social structure of
accumulation is partially constituted by the success of capital's
constitutionalization project and the success of that project is favored by
power of capital within that social structure. The project of
constitutionalizing labor rights pushes in the opposite direction, but does so
under adverse social, economic and constitutional conditions, whether we
think of the project as a defensive one that aims to preserve some space for
workers' voice and associational rights within a neoliberal regime or as part
of a larger transformative strategy that aims to constitutionalize a different
and more democratic regime of accumulation.
II. LABOR'S AND CAPITAL'S CONSTITUTIONS: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
Rather than elaborate in this short response on the mapping elements,
it will be more productive to put them to work in a particular context,
Canada. I start from the national scale, asking first about the hardness and
thickness of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' protection of
freedom of association in s. 2(d). Clearly, this is hard, judicially
enforceable law. It is, however, thin: freedom of association under the
15. For example, Stephen McBride, The New Constitutionalism: International and Private Rule in
the New Global Order, in RELATIONS OF GLOBAL POWER: NEOLIBERAL ORDER AND DISORDER 19(Gary Teeple & Stephen McBride eds., 2011); David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New
Constitutionalism, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 757 (2000); Stephen Gill, The Constitution of Global
Capitalism, THE GLOBAL SITE (2000), http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/ Ol0gill.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2012).
16. Gill, ibid. at 1. We might think here of Swedish social democracy and the reversal of
economic democracy initiatives, such as the Meidner Plan, since the 1970s. See Jonas Pontusson,
Radicalization and Retreat in Swedish Social Democracy, 163 NEW LEFT REV. 15 (1987). On the other
end of the spectrum is South Africa, which has one of the most progressive constitutions in regards to
the protection of social rights. There is much controversy over the effectiveness of the court in
enforcing these rights, but regardless of one's position the fact remains that the realization of social
rights runs against the current of neoliberal economic policies. Economic inequality has intensified, so
that South Africa is now is one of the most unequal societies in the world, where average life expectancy
is just 51.5 years. MARC KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN Two WORLDS 243-75 (2009); Brian
Ray, Engagement's Possibilities and Limits As a Socioeconomic Rights Remedy, 9 WASH. UNIV.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 399 (2010); Sam Ashman, Ben Fine & Susan Newman, The Crisis in South
Africa: Neoliberalism, Financialization and Uneven and Combined Development, in SOCIALIST
REGISTER 2011: THE CRISIS THIS TIME (Leo Panitch, Gregory Albo & Vivek Chibber eds.),
http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/issue/view/1097 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
360
LABOR'S MANY CONSTITUTIONS
Charter does not support economic democracy in the Sinzheimer sense, nor
much that might be said to prioritize human development over other
objectives. The thinness of labor rights under the Charter is often
overlooked because conventional understandings of labor rights in Canada
take this thinness for granted and instead focus on the questions that get
litigated and the movement of the court within this limited range. Thus in
the context of freedom of association, we have closely followed the
evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence, beginning with
the Labor Trilogy," which excluded collective bargaining and the right to
strike from freedom association, to Health Services,'8 which decisively
broke with the Trilogy and recognized a constitutional right to bargain
collectively, to Fraser,19 which seemingly signals a retreat that leaves in
place the constitutional right but arguably scales back its meaning to a duty
to consult and raises the evidentiary burden for vulnerable workers who
want to argue that current law fails to satisfy the state's constitutional duty
to enable them to meaningfully exercise their associational rights.20 While
this focus is understandable, any global assessment of Canadian labor's
national constitution and the project of its advancement through litigation
should not lose sight of its limited reach.
The formal constitutionalization of labor rights must also be
considered against the background of the competing neoliberal
constitutionalization project underway in Canada. It is has been argued, for
example, that the Charter itself does more to advance this neoliberal project
than it does to protect labor and social rights. Of course, it must be noted
that unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Canadian Charter does not protect
property rights. As has been widely noted, however, the Charter is at its
core a liberal document that is focused on the dangers of unchecked public
power, largely ignoring the dangers of unchecked private power. State
support for private property is not contestable, but state restrictions are,
albeit indirectly. Corporations have used the Charter to protect their
economic interests by challenging laws that limit commercial or political
speech or that attempt to impose absolute liability for regulatory offences.
17. Reference re Pub. Serv. Emps. Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v. Canada,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
18. Health Serv. & Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass'n. v. British Columbia, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 391.
19. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3.
20. For a useful summaries of the development of labor rights prior to Fraser, see Michael
MacNeil, Collective Bargaining in the Shadow of the Charter Cathedral: Union Strategies in a Post
B.C. Health World, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1739392; Judy Fudge, Brave
New Words: Labour, the Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 28 WINDSOR
YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 23 (2010). For a critical discussion of Fraser, see CONSTITUTIONAL
LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA: FARM WORKERS AND THE FRASER CASE (Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge &
Eric Tucker eds., 2012).
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Property owners are also constitutionally protected from state restrictions
that interfere with their ability to put their property to constitutionally
protected uses. This is one of the reasons why it is much more difficult to
successfully argue that the state owes a positive duty to protect labor
organizing or to require collective bargaining than it is to challenge laws
that restrict economic activity.21
A second but less noted path of neoliberal constitutionalization in
Canada is through the deepening of free trade federalism, 22 by which we
mean the removal of interprovincial barriers to trade. The starting point in
Canada under the Constitution Act is one in which a great deal of labor and
capital mobility is protected. For example, there are no tariffs on
interprovincial trade and individuals are free to choose where they live and
work in Canada. Under the division of powers, however, provinces have
regulatory powers that can produce differences in standards among the
provinces that may negatively affect interprovincial trade and labor
mobility. Whether these differences should be viewed as undesirable
barriers to trade or the legitimate expression of local preferences however is
more of a normative question than an economic one and a move to limit
local decision-making capacity is arguably best understood as part of the
advancement of a neoliberal SSA.23
Deepening the constitutionalization of internal free trade is a project
that has been developing over the past twenty years, although it has
occurred largely out of the public eye and with little fanfare. The
negotiation of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) in 1995 was
motivated by the strengthening of the free-trade agenda as expressed in the
successful negotiation of the Canada- U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1988
and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992. Without going
into details, it requires each province to "give up, lessen, or discipline itself
in using" governing capacities it previously enjoyed in the name of
promoting liberalized interprovincial trade.24 The AIT specifies broad
principles that include "non-discrimination, rights of entry to or exit from
provincial markets, that new provincial policies not create obstacles to
21. There is a vast literature on the subject. For starters, see ANDREW PETTER, THE POLITICS OF
THE CHARTER: THE ILLUSIVE PROMISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2010); Gavin W. Anderson,
Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism, 17 CAN. J. L. & JURISP. 31 (2004); JOEL
BAKAN, JUST WORDS (1997); MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF
POLITICS IN CANADA (revised ed. 1994).
22. G. BRUCE DOERN & MARK MACDONALD, FREE-TRADE FEDERALISM: NEGOTIATING THE
CANADIAN AGREEMENT ON INTERNAL TRADE (1999).
23. Mark Lee, Investor Rights and Canadian Federalism: The Case of TILM4, 82 STUD. IN POL.
ECON. 85 (2008).
24. DOERN & MACDONALD, supra note 22, at 154.
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trade, [and] that barriers due to differences in standards be reconciled." 25
Deviations from these objectives are permitted provided they can be
justified by "legitimate" objectives. 26  The dispute resolution mechanism
emphasizes the promotion of negotiated settlements but where these fail a
panel is established and makes a report. The report, however, cannot be
legally enforced and in the last instance retaliatory action can be taken by a
province against another where there has been a failure to implement panel
findings. In reality, however, the 1995 dispute resolution mechanism was
soft.27
Because of its perceived weakness, those favoring free-trade
federalism have pursued measures for its constitutionalization by thickening
and hardening investor rights. They have met with some success. First, in
2006, British Columbia and Alberta signed the Trade, Investment, and
Labor Mobility Agreement (TILMA), which imposes stronger limits on
provincial government action and gives investors a direct right to challenge
provincial and municipal laws and regulations that arguably violate the
agreement. Private panels hear such complaints and have the power to
award $5 million in penalties. The monetary liability of governments,
however, may not be capped at this amount if a measure offends several
sections of TILMA or if other investors make similar complaints. 28 Alberta
and British Columbia hoped that other provinces would sign onto the
agreement, but that did not occur. In July 2008, however, the provincial
premiers agreed to amend the AIT dispute resolution procedure to empower
AIT panels to impose a monetary penalty where a province has failed to
comply. The size of the penalty is to be calculated based on several factors,
including the seriousness of the "inconsistency" and the magnitude of its
impact, but an annex limits the amount based on the size of the province,
the maximum being $5 million.29  This provision only applied to
government to government complaints, but in the summer of 2011 the
Canadian and provincial governments announced their willingness to be
sued by private parties. 30
One might argue that the AIT and TILMA are not part of Canada's
formal constitution, but it is beyond dispute that they serve a similar
function, which is to bind the state's power in ways that are difficult to
undo. Moreover, these agreements entrench a neoliberal SSA, which is
25. John Whalley, Disciplining Canada's Interprovincial Barriers: The Subnational WTO
Approach As Another Option with or beyond an Extended TILMA, 35 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 315, 320 (2009).
26. Id.
27. DOERN & MACDONALD, supra note 22, at 137-40; Whalley, supra note 25, at 320-21.
28. Lee, supra note 23, at 99-100.
29. Agreement on Internal Trade, §§ 1701 (1 1)(b), 1707.1, Annex 1707.1(2).
30. Erin Weir, TILMA by stealth, RABBLE CA. (Jul. 16, 2011), http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/
progressive-economics-forum/2011/07/tilma-stealth (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
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essentially what Harry Arthurs means when he speaks of Canada's "real"
constitution as juxtaposed from its "formal" one. 31 The problem, as Arthurs
sees it, is that even with an expansion of labor's formal constitutional rights
to include collective bargaining and even potentially the freedom to strike,
very little will be accomplished when those rights must be applied in the
context of an advancing neoliberal regime of accumulation, entailing the
deregulation of business, privatization of what were formerly state
enterprises and responsibilities, and the globalization of production. The
deepening constitutionalization of such a regime makes the achievement of
meaningful constitutionalized labor rights that much more difficult. 32
Moving to the regional geographic scale, the most significant regional
instrument addressing labor rights is the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a side accord to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Starting from the dimension of thickness, it
would be fair to say that NAALC's labor constitution is thicker than the
Charter's. The eleven labor principles identified in the instrument not only
include freedom of association, and particularly, the right to organize and to
bargain collectively, but also the right to strike, a right which has not been
recognized under the Charter.33 In addition, the labor principles address
forced labor, child labor, minimum standards, employment discrimination,
equal pay, occupational health and safety, workers' compensation, and
migrant workers, all of which are addressed by Canadian statutory law,
some of which, like human rights codes, have a quasi-constitutional
status. 34
Apart from the question of whether the labor rights in the NAALC are
thicker than those in the domestic Canadian labor constitution, it is clear
that the NAALC does not entrench a labor constitution of worker voice in
the economy as thick as the one Sinzheimer proposed. Indeed, when we
focus on the broader dimension of the social structure of accumulation, we
3 1. Harry W. Arthurs, Labour and the 'Real' Constitution, 48 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 43, 61
(2007).
32. Private sector union densities have been declining for years and reached a new modem low in
2010 of 17.5%. Public sector union densities have fared better, but public sector collective bargaining
rights have been under attack. The most recent example of this was the Federal government's
legislation ending the lockout of post workers, which was particularly regressive, even by the standards
of back-to-work laws, in that it not only imposed a multi-year wage settlement, but did so at a level
lower than what Canada Post had been offering at the time of the lock-out. Restoring Mail Delivery for
Canadians Act, S.C. 2011, c. 17. For a more general overview of attacks of labor rights, see LEO
PANITCH & DONALD SWARTZ, FROM CONSENT TO COERCION: THE ASSAULT ON TRADE UNION
FREEDOMS (3d ed. 2003).
33. See Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, The Freedom to Strike in Canada: A Brief Legal History, 15
CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 333-53 (2010).
34. For a discussion of these more individualized rights, see Christian Brunelle, The Growing
Impact of Human Rights on Canadian Labour Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK: PERSPECTIVES ON
LAW AND REGULATION 119 (Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz eds., 2010).
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can see that NAFTA is better understood as part of the new
constitutionalism entrenching disciplinary neoliberalism by strengthening
investor and property rights, or as Grinspun and Kreklewich described it, a
conditioning framework consolidating neoliberal reforms.3 5  Indeed, it is a
measure that has promoted the spatialization of production, which has the
effect of weakening labor by putting it under the threat that production will
be relocated elsewhere. 36  Moreover, it is no secret that the NAALC was
negotiated as a result of political pressure on incoming President Clinton to
create a mechanism that might provide some amelioration against the
negative impact of free trade arrangements on U.S. labor. That is, in its
best light the NAALC is a sidecar attached to a very different constitutional
project running in the opposite direction.37
Finally, remaining at the regional level, there is the question of the
NAALC's hardness or softness. Much of the NAALC is soft. It aims to
promote the advancement of its labor principles in each jurisdiction and to
facilitate cooperation between the three parties through a commission and
secretariat. There is no hard law requirement for the signatories to
implement the labor principles and no mechanism to complain about their
failure to do so. Rather, complaints are limited to the failure of a signatory
to enforce whatever law in relation to the eleven labor principles that it has
on the books. The complaint process is three tiered. Complaints are
initially made to one of the National Administrative Offices (NAO). At the
first tier the NAO that receives the complaint conducts a review, which may
include public hearings, and issues a report. Ministerial consultations may
follow. To date, no complaint has gone further than the first tier if for no
other reason that the complainant loses carriage of the complaint and only
one of the ministers has the power to push the complaint to tier 2. This is
not a step that has been in any country's interest. For our purposes,
however, it is important to note that complaints about freedom of
association, collective bargaining and strikes cannot proceed beyond the
first tier. Only complaints about the failure to enforce the eight so-called
35. See generally Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms:
'Free Trade' As a Conditioning Framework, 43 STUD. POL. ECON. 33 (1994). See also David
Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 UNIV.
TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996); Stephen McBride, Quiet Constitutionalism in Canada: The International
Political Economy ofDomestic Institutional Change, 36 CAN. J. POL. SC. 251 (2003).
36. Michael Wallace & David Brady, Globalization or Spatialization? The Worldwide Spatial
Restructuring of the Labor Process, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM AND ITS CRISES: SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF ACCUMULATION THEORY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 121 (Terrence McDonough et al. eds.,
2010). See also Eric Tucker, Great Expectations Defeated?: The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining
Regimes in Canada and the U.S. post-NAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97 (2005).
37. NORMAN CAULFIELD, NAFTA AND LABOR IN NORTH AMERICA (2010).
38. Based on a recent visit to the website http://www.naalc.org/coop-activities.htm%20 (27 June,
2010), it appears that apart from some publications, there is little ongoing activity in this area.
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"technical labour standards" can go to the second tier, and of those only
three, child labor, minimum wages, and health and safety can proceed to the
third, where sanctions can be imposed. It is notable that a state's failure to
enforce whatever "voices at work" laws it has on the books is the most
weakly protected.39
Even though the NAALC is, for all practical purposes, soft law that
does not preclude it having a significant influence on the development of
Canada's labor constitution by its influence on government practice and
judicial discourse. There is little evidence, however, that it has done either.
Only two complaints have been made against Canada. One was refused
because it did not involve a failure to enforce and the other was settled with
an agreement to review the issue. No change to the substantive law
resulted. Canadian courts also do not cite the NAALC as a source of
international norms that should be used to interpret the Charter.40
The weak enforcement of the NAALC, and especially its workers'
voice provisions, contrasts sharply with the strong enforcement powers for
trade violations under the NAFTA, which permits private investors to take
an offending government to binding arbitration by private arbitrators vested
with the power to award damages and have its orders enforced in domestic
courts.41 A study of investor-state disputes under NAFTA up to October
2010 identified sixty-six cases, twenty-eight of them (43%) against
governments in Canada. The study found that the rate at which claims are
being made is growing and that in the last five years, 75% of claims were
against Canadian governments. Of those twenty-eight claims, NAFTA
tribunals awarded damages to investors in two. Canada has settled three
claims and in two it agreed to pay damages to the investor. Tribunals have
dismissed claims in four cases, four claims were withdrawn by the investor,
eight claims are inactive and seven claims are active. The cost of these
claims has been substantial. Canada has paid out $157 million in damages
and incurred millions of dollars in costs.4 2
39. For a description, see Lance Compa, NAFTA's Labour Side Agreement Five Years On:
Progress and Prospects for the NAALC, 7 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (1999).
40. For a somewhat more hopeful assessment of NAALC's potential, based largely on its fostering
of labor transnationalism, see Ruth Buchanan & Rusby Chaparro, International Institutions and
Transnational Advocacy: The Case of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 13 UCLA
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129 (2008).
41. For critical assessments of the investment rights regime and its constitutional implications, see
Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); David
Schneiderman, A New Global Constitutional Order?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2011).
42. Scott Sinclair, NAFTA Chapter 11Investor-State Disputes, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POL'Y
ALTERNATIVES, http://www.policyaltematives.ca/sites/default/files/ uploads/publications/National%20
Office/2010/ 1/NAFTA%20Dispute%20Table.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
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It is more difficult to assess the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 claims
on public policy development and democratic process. Early tribunal
decisions took an expansive view of investor rights, although some recent
ones have given more weight to regulatory concerns. Nevertheless, there is
some evidence that the threat of investor claims has produced regulatory
chill and the Canadian government's recent settlement of the AbitiBowater
claim for $130 million (based on a debatable claim that its timber and water
rights were taken) is also likely to encourage more investor claims.4 3
The difference between the protection of labor rights in the NAALC
and the protection of investor rights under NAFTA emphasizes the different
strengths of the two constitutionalization projects, again requiring that we
put Canadian labor's soft and thin regional constitution into perspective
when discussing its current state and prospects. It is a phenomenon that
also characterizes EU developments.44
We turn finally to the international scale of labor's constitution, where
the International Labor Organization (ILO) is the central player.
Discussions of the ILO are fraught with difficulty and controversy. This
becomes immediately obvious when we ask about the thickness of labor's
constitution under the ILO. For better or worse, the adoption of the
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998,
constituted a narrowing of the ILO's 'legislative' agenda, 45 but at the same
time, the Decent Work framework embraces a thicker agenda of social and
labor rights, albeit one that, in Jill Murray's analysis, has not been "fully
'constitutionalized."' 46 These difficulties are reduced to an extent if we
focus exclusively on the workers' voice dimension of the ILO's labor
constitution. Freedom of association principles have been enshrined in the
ILO Constitution since 1919 and the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944.
They are further developed in Convention 87, respecting freedom of
association and the right to organize, and Convention 98 respecting the
right to organize and collective bargaining. These principles have been
elaborated by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations and the Committee on Freedom of Association
43. STEPHEN MCBRIDE, PARADIGM SHIFT: GLOBALIZATION AND THE CANADIAN STATE 146-56
(2d ed. 1005); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 9, at 146-56; Sinclair, supra note 42.
44. See Fudge, supra note 13, at 463.
45. The debate is fierce. See, e.g., Philip Alston, "Core Labour Standards " and the
Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457 (2004); Brian
Langille, Core Labour Rights-the True Story (Reply to Alston), 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409 (2005).
46. Jill Murray, Taking Social Rights Seriously: Is There a Case for Institutional Reform of the
ILO?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK: PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 361 (Colin Fenwick &
Tonia Novitz eds., 2010).
3672012]
COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 33:355
(CFA) and are identified as core rights in the Declaration.47 But it is also
clear that the ILO does not embrace a thicker agenda of economic
democracy insisting upon worker voice at the level of coequal control over
the means of production. According to Gernigon et al., the purpose of
collective bargaining under the ILO labor constitution is "the regulation of
terms and conditions of employment, in a broad sense, and the relations
between the parties." 48 This "broad sense," however, is associated with the
bargaining over managerial prerogatives in relation to matters such as
promotions, and dismissals, not decisions over the deployment of the means
of production. 49
Turning next to the hardness dimension, ILO norms are essentially soft
ones that are dealt with through a complaint process that produces
communications directed to member governments requesting them to take
corrective action and to keep the ILO informed of its response. As with
other soft law mechanisms, the more important question is whether they
influence government action or the development of labor's domestic
constitution. The answer to the former question, at least in the Canadian
context, is that ILO findings have little sway with Canadian governments.
Indeed, in 2002 the Committee on Freedom of Association asked its
chairperson to hold consultations with the Canadian delegation to discuss
its concern about the unresponsiveness of Canadian governments to its
findings and requests. This action did not produce any change and
Canadian governments continue to violate ILO norms on freedom of
association without apparent concern for their international obligations.50
On the other hand, ILO norms have influenced the Supreme Court of
Canada's freedom of association jurisprudence over many years, beginning
with Chief Justice Dickson's dissent in one of the Labor Trilogy cases,
Alberta Reference, where he claimed that the Charter should be presumed
to provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in international
human rights documents Canada has ratified. More recently, international
labor norms were one of the three grounds offered by the Supreme Court of
Canada in extending freedom of association to protect collective bargaining
in Health Services.52
Despite this apparent acceptance of ILO norms, questions remain
about the court's commitment to these principles and their application by
47. For elaboration, see Adelle Blackett, Mutual Promise: International Labour Law and B.C.
Health Services, 48 SUPREME COURT L. REv. 365, 369-77 (2009); Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero, &
Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining, 139 INT'L LAB. REv. 33 (2000).
48. Gernigon, Oder & Guido, supra note 47, at 51.
49. Id. at 39-40.
50. DEREK FUDGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CANADA: HUMAN RIGHT OR ILLUSION (2006).
51. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 349.
52. [200712 S.C.R. 391, 69-79.
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ILO bodies. The most striking recent example of the court's selective use
of ILO jurisprudence is in the majority judgment in the recent Fraser
decision. The judgment cites the CFA's finding that the British Columbia
legislation that was the subject of the Health Services litigation violated
workers' freedom of association,53 but it ignores the CFA's interim decision
that the Agricultural Employees Protection Act fails to provide agricultural
workers with machinery promoting collective bargaining.54 One can only
assume the reason for this omission is that the CFA finding would be
"inconvenient" given the majority judgment's refusal to draw the same
conclusion. But if the court is truly committed to taking ILO principles
seriously, it cannot treat them purely instrumentally, citing those findings
that support its conclusions and ignoring those that do not.
In addition to the issue of selective citation of CFA decisions, the SCC
is also not committed the interpretation of ILO norms by ILO supervisory
bodies, but rather insists on giving its own meaning to terms like collective
bargaining. Their approach contrasts with the one adopted by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Demir and Baykara case, which
also involved the right to collective bargaining. In that case the ECtHR
held that the right to collective bargaining must meet the standards set by
the ILO and it deferred to the judgment of ILO supervisory bodies about
what is that standard.s
As with the other geographic scales, neoliberal constitutional projects
have enormous traction and are being conducted through other international
institutions with much greater capacity than the ILO to shape the emerging
world economic order. 56  The most important of these are the "unholy
trinity" of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the
WTO.5 ' The IMF and the World Bank have played a large role in
promoting and enforcing macroeconomic and structural reforms that
entrench neoliberal regimes, including privatization of state enterprises, the
liberalization of capital markets, tax reforms that favor the wealthy,
deregulation to create friendlier environments for investors and trade
53. 2011 S.C.C. 20, 1 94. 1 leave aside here the question of the court's competence to use ILO
norms, raised by Brian Langille, Can We Rely on the ILO?, 13 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 363 (2007).
54. INT'L LAB. ORG., 358TH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, IT 357-
58 (Nov. 2010), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed-normi@relconf/documents/meeting
document/wcms_146695.pdf.
55. Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1345, 11 147-54, available at
http://www.bailii.org/eulcases/ECHR/2008/1345.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012). The contrast between
the SCC and the ECtHR is developed by Keith Ewing & John Hendy, Giving Life to the ILO-Two
Cheers for the SCC, in CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA (Fay Faraday et al. eds., 2012).
56. See STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 131-35 (2d ed.
2008). A separate mapping of new constitutionalism would be necessary to provide greater
specification of its dimensions.
57. See generally RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO (2d ed.
2009).
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liberalization. While these reforms create a global neoliberal order, the
direct impact of the IMF is on borrowers who face "structural
conditionality" in order to gain access to IMF loans and since wealthier
developed countries, like Canada, are not in the position of having to rely
on the IMF, we will not consider its system of rules and their enforcement
here.58 Rather our focus is on the WTO.
The WTO was created in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations that lasted from 1986 to 1994. The motivation to create the
WTO was to strengthen global free trade, which had made limited advances
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in 1994,
largely in the area of tariff reductions. This goal was to be achieved by
creating a stronger institutional structure with a wider mandate and greater
enforcement powers than had existed under the GATT. In addition to
achieving further reductions on tariffs, the Uruguay Round introduced new
rules regarding nontariff barriers, which could potentially include an array
of local, provincial or national regulatory programs as well as import
licenses and quotas and government subsidies, and established agreements
on trade in services, intellectual property rights and trade-related
investment. As a result, the WTO regime reached far more deeply into
national economic policies than had the GATT.s9 In my terms, the WTO
regime has become thicker.
The regime also became harder. A system of adjudication existed
under the GATT, but it was constrained by rules that gave defendants the
ability to delay or block complaints. Under the WTO's more powerful
mechanisms, members can no longer block the establishment of a tribunal,
the rulings of the tribunal are binding, and retaliatory trade sanctions can be
imposed if a country is found not to have complied with a tribunal decision.
Unlike NAFTA, under the WTO only states, however, have standing to
bring complaints against other members. 60
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide an assessment of the
direct effects of WTO dispute resolution on the capacity of states generally,
or on Canada in particular, to regulate or pursue development strategies that
do not comply with neoliberal policy prescriptions. Froese concludes his
study of the impact of WTO trade litigation on Canada with the cautious
observation that: "[I]ts influence on domestic politics is only beginning to
58. For recent critical assessments, see, PEET, id.; Nitsan Chorev & Sarah Babb, The Crisis ofNeo-
Liberalism and the Future of International Institutions: A Comparison of the IMF and the WTO, 38
THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY 459 (2009). For an account of the inner dynamics that shaped the IMF's turn
toward neo-liberalism, see JEFFREY M. CHWIEROTH, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMF AND THE RISE OF
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION (2010). Finally, for an older critique of the IMF and World Bank, see
MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY (1999).
59. Chorev & Babb, supra note 58, at 470-71.
60. For a more detailed description, see FROESE, supra note 8, at 147-54.
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be understood. However, these cases suggest that the WTO has less direct
influence on policy than do domestic groups. Its influence is felt in more
subtle ways. As an institution, it is certainly a game changer." 61
He does not elaborate on the indirect influence the WTO has on
domestic policy and on the capacity of domestic groups to reshape that
policy, perhaps because it is probably impossible to isolate a specific
indirect WTO effect.62 When viewed as part of a larger international
project to constitutionalize a neoliberal social structure of accumulation, it
is fair to conclude that its indirect effects weigh in the direction of
strengthening the hand of capital, even if aspects of the WTO still respect a
limited right of states to adopt somewhat different regulatory models and to
enact measures protecting the environment and public health.63
This is not to say that the ILO is unable to influence these other
institutions and gain some commitment on their part to the protection of
core labor rights in their programs. Indeed, there has been some
cooperation between the ILO and the WTO. For example, in the 1996
Singapore Declaration, the members of the WTO renewed their
commitment to core labor standards and identified the ILO as the body
responsible "to set and deal with" these standards. The Declaration went on
to state the WTO view that core labor standards are best promoted through
trade liberalization, that it rejects the use of labor standards for protectionist
purposes and that it recognizes the legitimacy of low-wage labor as a
comparative advantage. The politics of bringing labor rights into the WTO
system are complicated and it is far from clear that even if a labor rights
clause were adopted it would be effective, since there is no place for unions
or nongovernmental organizations to make complaints, and even if a
complaint were made by a member, presumably it would have to
demonstrate that the violation of core labor standards created as unfair trade
advantage. In any event, to date, the WTO has resisted further engagement
with the labor rights issue64 and its pursuit within the WTO really involves
pushing the organization in the opposite direction of its primary agenda. As
Richard McIntyre notes:
Thus, in the end, the campaign for labour standards is not purely about
labour standards but about creating a wedge for bringing the concerns of
working people to the tables where the great issues of globalization are
61. Id. at 135.
62. Critical assessments of the impact of the WTO on workers' rights tend to focus more on trade
liberalization than on particular WTO decisions. For example, see STEVEN SHRYBMAN, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE 93-109 (2001).
63. For a more positive review, see TRISH KELLY, THE IMPACT OF THE WTO (2007). For a
negative view, see PEET, supra note 57, at 203-16; McBRIDE, supra note 43, at 156-65.
64. PEET, supra note 57, at 216-23; Gerrard Greenfield, Core Labor Standards in the WTO, 5
WORKINGUSA 9 (Summer 2001).
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decided. That we have so much difficulty doing so must be attributed
both to contemporary moral convention and class interest.65
Chart 1 below graphically depicts a simplified map of labor's and
capital's constitution. Two features are notable. First, as labor's
constitution becomes thicker at larger geographic scales it also becomes
softer. Narrow labor rights under the Charter are judicially enforceable,
while for all practical purposes the somewhat broader labor rights under the
NAALC are subject to low level ministerial consultations, and the ILO's
even broader labor rights are reviewable by a committee that can make
findings. The second feature is that what I have called capital's constitution
tends to cluster in the harder and thicker quadrant of the map and hang
above Canada's labor constitution at every geographic scale. I have not
attempted to map out differences in thickness for the national, regional and
international scales of capital's constitution, but I think it is clear that they
cover a much broader range of issues and cut more deeply into state
sovereignty than does labor's constitution. They establish the structural
conditions within which labor rights must operate. As far as hardness goes,
apart from Charter rights, which are equally juridified for labor and capital,
capital's constitution is much harder at every scale in the sense that there
are dispute resolution mechanisms that result in enforceable judgments.
Indeed, the trend has been to strengthen the enforceability of capital's
constitution, as we have seen in recent developments in free-trade
federalism at the national scale, the coming into force of NAFTA in 1994
and the establishment of the WTO in 1995.
65. RICHARD P. MCINTYRE, ARE WORKER RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 175 (2008).
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Canada's Labor and Capital Constitutions
Chart 1
International (ILO)
Labor Rights
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Moreover, all of this takes place within a partially constitutionalized
neoliberal social structure of accumulation, which exerts a stronger pull on
labor's constitution than labor's constitution exerts on capital's constitution.
These relationships are depicted in Chart 2.
The Context of Labor's Constitution
Chart 2
Labor's Constitution
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Capital's Constitution
Neoliberal Social Structure of Accumulation
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III. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
This Article proposed a scheme for mapping labor's constitution(s) on
three dimensions: its thickness, its hardness, and its geographic scale.
Taking the case of Canada, it found that labor's constitution becomes
thicker as its geographic scale becomes larger. It, however, also found that
as labor's constitution becomes thicker, it also becomes softer. It also
emphasized that the project of constitutionalizing labor rights must be
considered against the background of the project of constitutionalizing
capital rights. Again, using the Canadian case, the Article argues that at
every geographic scale, capital's constitution is thicker than labor's and
that, with the exception of Charter rights, capital's constitution is also
harder. Moreover, while there is a clear trend toward hardening capital's
constitution by strengthening enforcement procedures, there is no evident
trend toward the hardening of labor's constitution, again except at the level
of the Charter, where labor rights, to the extent they are recognized, are
hard.
In this final Section, I want to briefly raise a few questions that follow
from this analysis. The first relates to the thickness of labor's constitution.
For the most part, labor's constitutionalization project has been limited to
seeking protection for the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and
strike. In the larger scheme of things, these might seem to be modest goals.
The importance of seeking their protection in an era in which neoliberal
governments are stripping away these rights, however, cannot be
understated. Just recently in Canada the federal government threatened to
pass back to work legislation before a strike at an airline commenced,
passed back to work legislation ending a lockout by the employer in which
it imposed a wage settlement less than the employer's last offer, and
stopped flight attendants from striking by invoking a provision that limits
industrial conflict where it puts the health and safety of Canadians in
serious and immediate danger.66
Yet several questions remain. First, we might ask whether the project
of constitutionalizing a thick worker voice-something like Sinzheimer's
economic constitution-should be revived, notwithstanding the
impossibility of its realization in the foreseeable future. The question may
be significant because the answer can shape the way the demand for
freedom of association is framed. The dominant approach has been to
frame freedom of association as a human right, with the legal connotation
that it limits governmental attacks on associational freedoms and requires
66. Jim Stanford, Raitt's Three Principles Only Run One Way, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 2, 2011, at
A19.
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public support for their enjoyment in the face of employer resistance. This
is a defensive approach that secures a space for the exercise of associational
rights within a largely untransformed neoliberal social structure of
accumulation. Within this framework, a revival of the economic democracy
project is unnecessary. Indeed, the linking of associational freedoms to an
economic democracy frame might be strategically harmful because it will
potentially alienate judges whose support for constitutionalizing association
rights is crucial. Thus it is best to argue that labor's constitution can be
realized without significantly disturbing the current economic order.
Alternatively, we might want to consider whether too much is
conceded by abandoning the economic democracy project, especially if the
evidence suggests severe limits on the extent to which labor's associational
rights can be effectively constitutionalized as human rights in a neoliberal
social structure of accumulation that is in the process of being
constitutionalized. The Canadian case suggests there are significant limits
on what can be accomplished at the national scale, especially if the project
is pursued primarily through litigation. On the regional level, the North
American experience is also not very encouraging either, but the story may
be different for the Europe and the Antipodes.
Additionally, if popular mobilization is required to make associational
rights meaningful on any geographic scale, is a human rights frame
adequate for the task, or is it, perhaps, even counterproductive because it
embraces a liberal discourse of rights that potentially undermines labor's
capacity for class-based approaches to advancing workers' rights?67 Does
this require, as Sinzheimer argued, that we recognize collective
representation is necessary because under capitalism class conflict is
inherent and, therefore, the advancement of workers' interests as
individuals is bound up with the improvement of their class? And, if we are
really serious that the full development of human potential should be the
central aim of a just society, must workers' voice be thickly
constitutionalized so that their labor is no longer alienated through the
contract of employment to an employer who determines how it will be
deployed to expand exchange value, leaving workers with constrained
opportunities to develop themselves as full human beings through their
work and through collective deliberations over what use values are needed
and how they will be produced and distributed?
67. For arguments along these lines, see Larry Savage, Workers' Rights As Human Rights:
Organized Labor and Rights Discourse in Canada, 34 LAB. STUD. J. 8 (2009); Kevin Kolben, Labor
Rights As Human Rights?, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2009-2010); Nelson Lichtenstein, The Rights
Revolution, 12 NEW LAB. FORUM 61 (2003); David Brody, Labour Rights As Human Rights: A Reality
Check, 39 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 601 (2001).
3752012]
COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 33:355
All talk of economic democracy must seem hopelessly utopian in an
age when the project of creating a market-based "stark utopia" 68 as Polanyi
described it, is so far advanced. But if Polanyi is also right that an
unregulated market order will produce severe dysfunctional social,
economic and ecological consequences that over time will generate large-
scale social resistance, then perhaps the project of retrieving Sinzheimer's
thick labor constitution is relevant.
Another issue for further reflection is the geographic scale of labor's
constitution. As we have seen, in Canada the labor movement has worked
primarily at the national and the international scale, through the Charter
and the ILO, to promote its "labor rights are human rights" agenda. The
NAALC has pretty much fallen by the wayside, although transnational
activism, aimed largely at failures to enforce Mexican labor law, has
increased.69 Australia also seems to have followed this course, presumably
because of the absence of a regional framework for pursuing labor rights,
while in the United Kingdom its membership in the EU provides a very
different opportunity structure.70 While national labor movements may
focus on what works best from within their own jurisdiction, larger
questions remain about the implications of the uneven geographic
development of labor's constitution and whether significant differences can
be sustained before downward pressures begin to operate through
international labor arbitrage. Of course, the ILO and regional instruments
exist in part to push in the opposite direction and strengthen national labor
constitutions, and transnational labor activism supports those efforts, but it
is an open question whether these institutions and activists have the
capacity to do so. Thinking about how to build these capacities and
strengthen labor's constitutions in a regionally and globally coordinated
way are important and difficult questions for a transnational voices at work
project.7'
Finally, we might want to inquire more deeply into mechanisms for
hardening labor rights. For the most part, we tend to associate hardness
with judicial enforcement, putting courts at the centre of the project. Apart
from the historical antipathy of most courts towards collective labor rights
68. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 3 (1957).
69. See generally Buchanan & Chaparro, supra note 40.
70. Colin Fenwick, Workers' Human Rights in Australia, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK:
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 41 (Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz eds., 2010); ACL Davies,
Workers' Human Rights in English Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK: PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND
REGULATION 171 (Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz eds., 2010).
71. For some interesting reflections on the difficulties of labor rights transnational activism on, see
Gay Seidman, Deflated Citizenship: Labor Rights in a Global Era, in PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE:
GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CITIZENSHIP GAP 109 (Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds.,
2004).
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and the question of whether that can be overcome in an environment in
which neoliberalism is ascendant, there is also the question, mentioned
earlier, of the impact of pursuing labor rights through litigation on the
development of popular mobilization strategies that might be more
successful in the long run. As well, there are overarching questions of the
courts' democratic legitimacy and its institutional capacity to develop and
enforce constitutionalized economic and social rights of any kind.72 It is
interesting that capital's constitution is increasingly enforced by private
arbitration, thereby reducing democratic accountability and exacerbating
concerns about democratic legitimacy. Can labor's constitution be
hardened without resort to traditional mechanisms of judicial review, but in
a manner that builds democratic capacities?
72. For a thoughtful overview of the literature and a discussion of these issues in the context of
South Africa, see Brian Ray, Policentrism, Political Mobilization, and the Promise of Socioeconomic
Rights, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 151 (2009).
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